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ABSTRACT 
In every federal civil case, a defendant must raise its affirmative 
defenses in the pleading that responds to a plaintiff’s complaint. 
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c), failure to properly 
plead, for example, a statute of limitations defense, waives the 
defense for good. Rule 8(c) does not exempt any category of 
affirmative defense, nor does it forgive unintentional omissions of 
certain defenses. It also does not prefer governmental defendants to 
others. Yet in habeas corpus cases, the most significant affirmative 
defenses to habeas petitions need not comply with Rule 8(c). Instead, 
federal courts may raise the affirmative defenses of statute of 
limitations, exhaustion of state remedies, procedural default and 
nonretroactivity sua sponte even if the defense would otherwise be 
waived pursuant to Rule 8(c). 
This Article contends that habeas litigation is the worst place to 
grant State respondents any sort of procedural favor. Habeas cases 
implicate criminal convictions that are fundamentally unfair. And 
habeas petitioners need all the help they can get—since the passage of 
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the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 
the odds of winning habeas relief are akin to the odds of winning the 
lottery. 
After examining the history of affirmative defenses, the Article 
next describes the purpose behind Rule 8(c) and argues that the rule 
was meant to be strictly applied. It next explains how federal courts’ 
willingness to take sua sponte action on behalf of habeas respondents 
violates both the spirit and the letter of Rule 8(c). It further argues that 
the Supreme Court’s reliance on comity and other policy-based 
justifications do not suffice to overcome the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which apply without regard to what sort of case is being 
heard. In light of the curtailed substantive paths to habeas relief, it 
also contends that habeas cases are the worst candidates for 
aggressive sua sponte advocacy that revives affirmative defenses at 
the expense of those imprisoned unfairly. 
With respect to Rule 8(c), habeas respondents should be treated 
similarly to, not differently from, every other civil defendant. The 
Article concludes that assisting respondents with sua sponte action in 
habeas cases conflicts with the purpose of an adversarial system by 
giving an unfair advantage to defendants who need it the least. 
INTRODUCTION 
n every federal civil case, a defendant must raise its affirmative 
defenses in the pleading that responds to a plaintiff’s complaint.1 
Unless granted leave to amend, failure to properly plead, for example, 
a statute of limitations defense, waives that defense for good.2 Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) (Rule 8(c)) states this requirement in 
simple terms: “In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively 
state any . . . affirmative defense.”3 The rule does not exempt any 
particular defense—res judicata is as waivable as the defense of injury 
by fellow servant.4 The rule does not forgive unintentional omissions 
of certain defenses.5 Nor does the rule give preferential treatment to 
 
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
2 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1278 (3d ed. 1998). 
3 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
4 See id. 
5 Harris v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 126 F.3d 339, 343 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). 
I 
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government defendants, even though they receive concessions 
elsewhere in the Rules.6 
Although habeas petitions challenge criminal convictions, they are 
treated as civil cases in federal court and proceed through federal 
dockets much like other civil cases. There are some semantic 
differences. In habeas litigation, plaintiffs challenging their state 
criminal convictions—“petitioners”—sue “respondents.” Still, like 
any other civil defendant, respondents may answer or move to dismiss 
a habeas petition.7 Yet, the Supreme Court has exempted the most 
significant affirmative defenses to habeas petitions from the strictures 
of Rule 8(c). 
Although ordinarily the affirmative defense of statute of limitations 
“is forfeited if not raised in a defendant’s answer or in an amendment 
thereto,” this is not the case when a State is responding to a habeas 
petition.8 Instead, federal courts may raise the defense on the State’s 
behalf sua sponte even if the State fails to raise it in its first 
responsive pleading.9 The same is true with respect to the affirmative 
defenses of exhaustion of state remedies, procedural default and 
nonretroactivity—all survive despite a habeas respondent’s failure to 
comply with Rule 8(c).10 As a result, affirmative defenses that would 
be deemed waived in any other federal civil case survive in habeas 
actions even when respondents fail to comply with Rule 8(c). 
Sua sponte action of any kind is a departure from an adversarial 
system of litigation and risks handing an advantage to the party that 
benefits from the sua sponte act. The stakes are certainly higher in 
habeas than they are, for example, in copyright. Nevertheless, federal 
courts are less willing to raise affirmative defenses sua sponte in 
 
6 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(B) (“A party must serve an answer to a 
counterclaim or crossclaim within 20 days after being served with the pleading that states 
the counterclaim or crossclaim.”) (emphasis added), with FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(2) (“The 
United States, a United States agency, or a United States officer or employee sued only in 
an official capacity must serve an answer to a complaint, counterclaim, or crossclaim 
within 60 days after service on the United States attorney.”) (emphasis added). 
7 Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, R. 5 (discussing answer to 
habeas petition); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989) (respondent may move 
to dismiss habeas petition). 
8 Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006). 
9 See id. (lower court has discretion to correct State’s error and dismiss habeas petition 
as untimely). 
10 Id. at 206, 208. 
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copyright actions than they are in habeas cases.11 How can this be? In 
copyright, a plaintiff seeks money damages. In habeas, a petitioner 
seeks his freedom. 
This Article will not chronicle the many ways in which habeas has 
been substantively curtailed.12 Instead, it examines how federal 
courts’ willingness to take sua sponte action on behalf of habeas 
respondents violates procedural rules and relies on unsound policy. 
Given the curtailed substantive paths to habeas relief, habeas cases 
are the worst candidates for aggressive sua sponte advocacy that 
revives affirmative defenses at the expense of parties seeking to void 
unfair convictions. At a minimum, when it comes to procedural rules 
like Rule 8(c), habeas respondents should be treated similarly to, not 
more preferentially than, every other civil defendant. 
The Article begins by describing how a federal habeas petition 
moves through federal court much like any other federal civil case. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in habeas cases just as 
they do in other civil cases. Second, it traces the history of affirmative 
defenses in federal practice and explains how those defenses must be 
pled in light of Rule 8(c). Third, the Article reviews federal courts’ 
reliance on their sua sponte authority and contends that sua sponte 
raising of affirmative defenses has significant consequences that upset 
the adversarial system. 
Fourth, the Article argues that Rule 8(c) should be strictly applied 
in habeas actions and that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence fails to 
offer any sound reason—policy, practical, or otherwise—that justifies 
helping habeas respondents by raising their affirmative defenses sua 
sponte. The Article concludes by contending that assisting 
respondents with sua sponte action in habeas cases violates the most 
important aspect of American litigation’s adversarial system: it gives 
an unfair advantage to defendants who have no need for the courts’ 
advocacy. 
 
11 E.g., Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1240 (11th Cir. 2010) (reversing 
district court’s raising of affirmative defense of fair use sua sponte in copyright 
infringement case). 
12 A habeas petition has very little chance of succeeding in federal court since Congress 
passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), 
which created “a series of new procedural obstacles,” including “a first-ever time limit for 
filing a first habeas petition; stricter barriers to review of second and successive petitions; 
and a new, tougher standard of review.” Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Essays, 
Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 806 (2009). 
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I 
HABEAS CORPUS: SUBSTANTIVELY UNIQUE, PROCEDURALLY 
UNREMARKABLE 
The volume of law review articles and seminal Supreme Court 
decisions attests to the fact that habeas corpus matters. The writ has a 
storied purpose: “[T]he protection of individuals against erosion of 
their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.”13 
Blackstone himself labeled it “the great and efficacious writ, in all 
manner of illegal confinement.”14 Even its nickname, “the Great 
Writ,” signals to every law student learning about it for the first time 
to pay attention.15 
In granting a habeas petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 
a single federal judge can overturn the judgment of a state’s highest 
court when the petition relates to “the application of the United States 
Constitution or laws to the facts in question.”16 “[A]bsent suspension, 
the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual 
detained within the United States.”17 The Supreme Court had 
described the “preferred place of the Great Writ in our constitutional 
system,”18 but its efficacy has been eroded over time by substantive 
and procedural hurdles. 
The Great Writ has come under fire in recent decades. In 1996, 
Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996 (AEDPA), which implemented significant changes to the 
manner in which habeas petitions may be brought and on what 
grounds habeas challenges may be raised. “AEDPA imposed strict 
time limits on the filing of federal habeas corpus actions, gave 
 
13 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). 
14 Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969) (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES 131 (Lewis ed., 1902)). 
15 Law students are likely introduced to habeas through a discussion of Ex parte 
Milligan, 71 U.S. (2 Wall.) (1866), in which “the Court struck down military commissions 
convened unilaterally by President Lincoln during the Civil War largely as a violation of 
the defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, rejecting the government’s argument 
that the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 had effectively authorized President Lincoln’s 
actions.” Stephen I. Vladeck, Book Review, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 941, 963 (2011); see also Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 46–47 (1972) (Douglas, J. 
concurring) (“[H]abeas corpus is an overriding remedy to test the jurisdiction of the 
military to try or to detain a person” and “[t]he classic case is Ex parte Milligan . . . where 
habeas corpus was issued on behalf of a civilian tried and convicted in Indiana by a 
military tribunal.”). 
16 Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 543–44 (1981). 
17 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 
18 Parisi, 405 U.S. at 47 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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preclusive effect to orders denying habeas relief, and essentially 
limited habeas corpus relief to bad faith or patently unreasonable state 
court errors.”19 Following AEDPA, Supreme Court decisions “reflect 
a general preference towards substantial deference to lower court 
findings, limits on review in the interest of finality, and general 
limitations on the application of constitutional rules to state 
prisoners.”20 
The literature addressing the narrowed path to habeas relief 
examines the impact of habeas-specific statutes, rules, and policy. The 
message in that line of scholarship is, essentially, that habeas is 
“different.” But missing is an acknowledgement of the many ways in 
which habeas cases are so much like other federal civil cases. 
A prisoner’s federal habeas petition progresses procedurally much 
like all federal civil cases. Even though habeas corpus petitions 
challenge criminal convictions, they are processed as civil cases and 
assigned a civil docket number.21 The analog to a complaint in the 
habeas context is an “application,” which, like a complaint, 
commences the action.22 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply by default “to the 
extent that they are not inconsistent with the Habeas Corpus Rules.”23 
For example, Rule 12(b)(6) applies to States’ motions to dismiss 
petitions brought pursuant to section 2254.24 And motions to amend a 
State’s answer to a habeas petition are governed by Rule 15(a).25 In 
theory, if “a statutory time limitation is forfeited if not raised in a 
 
19 Stephen F. Smith, Articles, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 283, 301 (2008). 
20 Jordon T. Stanley, “Deference Does Not Imply Abandonment or Abdication of 
Judicial Review”: The Evolution of Habeas Jurisprudence Under AEDPA and the 
Rehnquist Court, 72 UNIV. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 739, 745 (2004). 
21 Jonathan D. Rosenbloom, Exploring Methods to Improve Management and Fairness 
in Pro Se Cases: A Study of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New York, 30 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 317 n.53 (2002). 
22 McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 866 n.2 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
23 Id. (citing Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 11; FED. R. 
CIV. P. 81(a)(2) (current version at FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a)(4)); see also Slack v. McDaniel, 
529 U.S. 473, 489 (2000). 
24 Walker v. Kelly, 589 F.3d 127, 139 (4th Cir. 2009). 
25 See, e.g., Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying Rule 15(a) to 
a motion for leave to amend answer to habeas petition, and stating that “[c]ourts may 
freely grant leave when justice so requires, and public policy strongly encourages courts to 
permit amendments” (citations omitted)). 
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defendant’s answer or in an amendment thereto” pursuant to Rules 
8(c), 12(b), and 15(a),26 the same should be true in habeas. 
For a limited period of time at the beginning of a habeas case, 
habeas procedure varies from the procedure in other civil cases. Rule 
4 of the habeas rules (applicable in section 2254 cases) provides that a 
court assigned a habeas petition “must promptly examine it,” and “[i]f 
it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the 
petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must 
dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.”27 
However, if the judge does not dismiss the petition, the court will 
order the respondent to answer or move to dismiss.28 As a result, 
unlike any other civil case, in habeas, a district court may act to 
dismiss a frivolous pleading before the defendant has to answer or 
move to dismiss.29 
Yet with the exception of the pre-answer review described above, a 
habeas petition should progress procedurally just as any other federal 
civil action does. With respect to procedure, habeas is like other civil 
cases, not different. 
II 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES: WHAT THEY ARE, AND HOW THEY ARE 
PLED 
To understand why affirmative defenses to habeas corpus petitions 
should be treated like any other affirmative defense, it is useful to 
understand exactly what an affirmative defense is, and why 
affirmative defenses are governed by specific pleading standards. 
A. Affirmative Defenses Under the Federal Rules 
In the context of habeas corpus petitions, the defenses of statute of 
limitations, exhaustion of state remedies, procedural default, and 
nonretroactivity are all affirmative defenses.30 But what makes a 
defense an affirmative defense? 
 
26 Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006). 
27 Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 4. 
28 Id. 
29 See, e.g., Kiser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1999). Kiser also holds that 
Rule 8(c) “does not bar sua sponte consideration of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations 
provision” because Rule 8(c) is inconsistent with Rule 4 of the habeas rules. Id. at 329. 
30 Day, 547 U.S. at 208. 
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Civil defendants can avoid liability in a number of ways. If a 
doctor is sued for medical malpractice with respect to a patient he 
never treated, the doctor might reply to the patient’s complaint with 
emphatic factual denials. In so doing, the doctor will attack the 
patient’s prima facie case by way of a “negative defense.”31 In 
response to plaintiff’s allegations, the doctor essentially says “no.” 
But a doctor sued by a patient he did treat may accept all of the 
patient’s allegations as true and still win if he asserts an affirmative 
defense. An affirmative defense based on, for example, assumption of 
risk, does not require the doctor to deny any of the plaintiff patient’s 
factual allegations, but may still result in a victory for the doctor.32 
“An affirmative defense is one that admits the allegations in the 
complaint, but avoids liability, in whole or in part, by new allegations 
of excuse, justification or other negating matters.”33 It “raises matters 
extraneous to the plaintiff’s prima facie case.”34 An affirmative 
defense sets forth “new allegations,” and therefore, a defendant acts 
affirmatively in pleading it.35 In asserting an affirmative defense, the 
doctor’s response to a patient’s allegations is not “no,” but rather, 
“yes, but . . .” 
To plead the affirmative defense of assumption of risk, the 
defendant doctor would have to assert that the plaintiff “voluntarily 
assume[d] a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless 
conduct of the defendant.”36 Assumption of risk is an affirmative 
defense because it “comes into question only where there would 
otherwise be a breach of some duty owed by the defendant to the 
plaintiff,” and “relieves the defendant of the liability to which he 
would otherwise be subject.”37 
Affirmative defenses are descendants of the common law plea of 
“confession and avoidance.” At common law, confession and 
avoidance “permitted a defendant who was willing to admit that the 
 
31 Riemer v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 274 F.R.D. 637, 639 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
32 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
33 Riemer, 274 F.R.D. at 639. 
34 In re Rawson Food Service, Inc., 846 F.2d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Ford 
Motor Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 795 F.2d 538, 546 (6th Cir. 1986)). 
35 Technically, “[a]n affirmative defense is . . . ‘[a] defendant’s assertion [which] 
rais[es] new facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff’s or prosecution’s 
claim, even if all allegations in the complaint are true.’” Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 
F.3d 337, 350 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 430 (7th ed.1999)); see 
also Gwin v. Curry, 161 F.R.D. 70, 71 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965). 
37 Id. § 496G cmt. c. 
MACFARLANE 10/22/2012  1:02 PM 
186 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 177 
plaintiff’s declaration demonstrated a prima facie case to then go on 
and allege additional new material that would defeat the plaintiff’s 
otherwise valid cause of action.”38 
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)’s Affirmative Defense 
Pleading Standard 
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its subsections 
govern pleading standards. Rule 8(a) controls how claims must be 
pled,39 while Rule 8(c) controls how a party is to plead affirmative 
defenses, providing that “[i]n responding to a pleading, a party must 
affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense,” including: 
“accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, 
contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, 
failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, 
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute 
of limitations, and waiver.”40 
Although Rule 8(c) is a subsection of a rule very clearly pertaining 
to pleading standards, it is often described as a substantive rule about 
affirmative defenses. An oft-repeated quote from the venerable 
Wright & Miller treatise describes Rule 8(c) as a “lineal descendent 
of the common-law plea in ‘confession and avoidance,’ which 
permitted a defendant who was willing to admit that plaintiff’s 
declaration demonstrated a prima facie case to then go on and allege 
additional new material that would defeat plaintiff’s otherwise valid 
cause of action.”41 This is not entirely accurate, and treating Rule 8(c) 
as anything but a pleading standard robs it of its bite. 
First, the Federal Rules treat affirmative defenses differently than 
the common law treated confession and avoidance. Under the 
common law, a defendant “could not both deny the elements of the 
plaintiff’s substantive claim and use a confession and avoidance.”42 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eliminate the “imposed election 
between the pleader’s right to deny the allegations in the complaint 
 
38 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 2, § 1270. 
39 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
40 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
41 Middle East Eng’g & Dev. Co. v. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 86 Civ. 
834 (MGC), 1987 WL 17419, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1270 (2d ed. 1969 & 
West Supp. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
42 5 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 2, at § 1270. 
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and the right to interpose other defensive matter,” by virtue of Rule 
8(e), “which allows alternative and hypothetical pleading.”43 
Second, Rule 8(c) does not codify the common law confession and 
avoidance defenses. In common law pleading, matters in confession 
and avoidance were matters which said “yes”—that is, they admitted 
the complaint’s allegations—and also said “but”—that is, they 
“suggest[ed] some other reasons why there was no right.”44 Rule 8(c), 
unlike the common law, “makes no attempt to define the concept of 
affirmative defense.”45 The rule lists nineteen defenses, some of 
which would not have been considered matters in confession and 
avoidance, re-labels them affirmative defenses, and further states that 
those affirmative defenses, along with any other affirmative defenses 
not expressly listed, must be asserted in a defendant’s responsive 
pleading.46 The drafters did not intend for Rule 8(c) to be a 
substantive rule; rather, it was meant to require that “certain regularly 
occurring matters” be set forth in the affirmative before the district 
court considers them to be part of the case.47 
In sum, Rule 8(c) is a pleading standard, not a substantive rule, and 
certainly not a lineal descendant of common law defenses. 
C. Rule 8(c) Is A Waiver Rule With No Exceptions 
Rule 8(c) is clear with respect to a defendant’s pleading burdens: 
“In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any 
avoidance or affirmative defense.”48 The Supreme Court has 
described Rule 8(c) in absolute terms: the rule “identifies a 
nonexhaustive list of affirmative defenses that must be pleaded” in 
response to a complaint.49 Moreover, Rule 8(c), and all “the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure are ‘as binding as any statute duly enacted 
by Congress, and federal courts have no more discretion to disregard 
 
43 Id. 
44 Id. (quoting AM. BAR. ASS’N, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE INSTITUTE AT WASHINGTON, D.C. AND OF THE SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY 
49 (Edward H. Hammond ed., 1939) (statement of Hon. Charles Clark) [hereinafter 
PROCEEDINGS]. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
49 Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007) (emphasis added). 
MACFARLANE 10/22/2012  1:02 PM 
188 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 177 
the Rule[s] . . . than they do to disregard constitutional or statutory 
provisions.’”50 
Several policy reasons support strict application of Rule 8(c). First, 
there is nothing unfair about strict compliance with Rule 8(c): “Rule 
8(c) . . . place[s] the opposing parties on notice that a particular 
defense will be pursued so as to prevent surprise or unfair 
prejudice.”51 The rule’s mandatory provision regarding affirmative 
defenses was intended to be “definite and certain,” as well as fair to 
the plaintiff, who is provided with notice at a case’s inception as to 
what affirmative material will be raised against it.52 Under the rule, 
“[a] general assertion that the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a 
claim is insufficient to protect the plaintiff from being ambushed with 
an affirmative defense.”53 Rather, defenses must be affirmatively 
stated. 
Furthermore, “our legal system is replete with rules requiring that 
certain matters be raised at particular times.”54 Rule 8(c) is one of 
those rules. In this respect, however, Rule 8(c) stands apart from the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a whole, which were intended to 
render procedure subservient to the merits.55 Rule 8(c) is a rule that, if 
not followed, permits procedure to trump substance. As explained 
below, this divergence was intentional. 
In 1939, one year after the rules went into effect, Honorable 
Charles E. Clark, the Reporter to the Supreme Court’s Advisory 
Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure and the rules’ principal 
draftsman, described Rule 8(c) as follows: 
 
50 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 66 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 
(1988)). 
51 Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 350 (2d Cir. 2003). 
52 5 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 2, § 1270 (quoting PROCEEDINGS, supra 
note 44, at 49). 
53 Saks, 316 F.3d at 350. 
54 Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011). 
55 Honorable Charles E. Clark was one of the greatest influences on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. “After nearly 15 years at the Yale Law School spent teaching and 
writing on civil procedure, Clark was appointed Reporter to the Supreme Court’s Advisory 
Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure.” Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914, 915 (1976). Clark was “the 
nation’s foremost authority on code procedure, and he seized the opportunity to embed 
throughout the federal rules his philosophy that procedural rules should be subservient to 
trials on the merits.” Douglas D. McFarland, Seeing the Forest for the Trees: The 
Transaction or Occurrence and the Claim Interlock Civil Procedure, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. 
REV. 247, 251 n.25 (2011) (citing Charles E Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH U. 
L. Q. 297, 297 (1938)). 
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 [Rule 8(c)] is an attempt to handle specifically a question which 
has raised a great deal of difficulty in pleading generally, and 
particularly in the codes of the country. It seems to be considered 
only fair that certain types of things which in common law pleading 
were matters in confession and avoidance—i.e., matters which 
seemed more or less to admit the general complaint and yet to 
suggest some other reasons why there was no right—must be 
specifically pleaded in the answer, and that has been a general 
rule.56 
Clark described the waiver rule as “fair”—the waiver rule is 
necessary in order to counterbalance the effect of permitting 
defendants to raise defenses “which seemed more or less to admit the 
general complaint and yet to suggest some other reasons why there 
was no right.”57 It is a privilege, Clark seemed to be saying, to allow 
defendants to raise affirmative defenses. Therefore, if defendants are 
to be afforded that privilege, the consequences of permitting 
affirmative defenses in general will be counterbalanced by requiring 
that they be pled in a particular way. For that reason, there is only one 
protection against the waiver rule’s severity: the freedom to amend 
safeguards any defense that might otherwise be waived by virtue of 
Rule 8(c).58 
Despite its express language and singular purpose, in practice, Rule 
8(c) begins to look more like a suggestion. By 1975, the Second 
Circuit described Rule 8(c)’s waiver provision as “[t]he ordinary 
consequence of failing to plead an affirmative defense.”59 Only 
ordinarily would a defense’s forced waiver exclude the defense from 
the case. “In the real world, however, failure to plead an affirmative 
defense will rarely result in waiver.”60 Even Wright and Miller 
describe the rule with a touch of irony: 
 It is a frequently stated proposition . . . that a failure to plead an 
affirmative defense as required by Federal Rule 8(c) results in the 
waiver of that defense and its exclusion from the case. . . . [A]s a 
practical matter there are numerous exceptions to it based on the 
circumstances of particular cases.61 
 
56 5 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 2, § 1270 (quoting PROCEEDINGS, supra 
note 44, at 49) (emphasis added). 
57 Id. 
58 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 44, at 74. 
59 Jakobsen v. Mass. Port Auth., 520 F.2d 810, 813 (1st Cir. 1975) (emphasis added). 
60 Bobbitt v. Victorian House, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 734, 736 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (“[F]ailure to 
advance a defense initially should prevent its later assertion only if that will seriously 
prejudice the opposing party.”). 
61 5 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 2, § 1278. 
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Nevertheless, because Rule 8(c), like any other Federal Rule, is 
binding, and because it was intended to stand apart as a procedural 
rule with bite, no federal court has authority to sua sponte cast it 
aside. 
III 
SUA SPONTE ACTION: WHEN COURTS RAISE CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 
NORMALLY RAISED BY THE PARTIES 
The federal system is an adversarial system of justice. If the system 
functions normally, “courts are generally limited to addressing the 
claims and arguments advanced by the parties.”62 “[T]he parties are 
obliged to present facts and legal arguments before a neutral and 
relatively passive decision-maker.”63 But the system does not always 
function according to plan. When courts take action sua sponte by 
raising claims or defenses without prompting from any of the parties, 
they act according to their inherent authority.64 Courts are required to 
take certain action sua sponte. A familiar form of sua sponte action is 
a court’s sua sponte invocation of the defense of lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.65 
Once a defense is branded as one that affects a court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction, a court must raise the defense sua sponte.66 
Because jurisdictional defenses are never waived, they may be raised 
at any moment throughout litigation, sua sponte or otherwise—even 
after a district court has held a trial and reached a decision on the 
merits. 
As a result, whether a defense goes to a court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction is not merely a semantic question, but one of 
“considerable practical importance” for both judges and litigants.67 
The Supreme Court has cautioned that mislabeling a defense as one 
that implicates subject matter jurisdiction may waste judicial 
resources and unfairly prejudice litigants who have litigated the 
matter without knowledge of the defense’s applicability.68 The 
 
62 Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011). 
63 Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2006). 
64 See, e.g., Hooper v. City of Montgomery, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1338 (M.D. Ala. 
2007). 
65 Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012) (citing United States v. Cotton, 535 
U.S. 625, 630 (2002)). 
66 Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
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consequences that attach to the jurisdictional label may be so drastic 
that the Court has tried to limit the use of the term “jurisdictional.”69 
Absent sua sponte intervention, the “normal operation” with 
respect to affirmative defenses is Rule 8(c)’s waiver rule, which 
requires a defendant, and not the court, to plead a statute of 
limitations defense, along with any other affirmative defense, in its 
answer to the complaint.70 The Fourth Circuit has held that in 
“ordinary” civil cases, district courts may not raise and consider a 
defense of statute of limitations sua sponte.71 The court explained that 
the statute of limitations is a defense “waivable by the inaction of a 
party;” it “bears the hallmarks of our adversarial system of justice,” 
one that is notable in that the parties present the facts and legal 
arguments before a neutral and, ideally, passive court.72 
In addition, the Supreme Court has warned federal courts raising 
otherwise waivable affirmative defenses sua sponte to be cautious.73 
Why? Because raising an affirmative defense sua sponte “erod[es] the 
principle of party presentation so basic to our system of 
adjudication.”74 That is, in a neutral system, a defendant should be the 
party pointing out the weaknesses of a plaintiff’s claim. If the Court 
raises this argument on the defendant’s behalf, the system is no longer 
neutral, and the Court has become the defendant’s representative. 
These are the same concerns courts have when they convert a defense 
into one that implicates subject matter jurisdiction: the practice “alters 
the normal operation of our adversarial system,” under which “courts 
are generally limited to addressing the claims and arguments 
advanced by the parties.”75 
Altering the normal course of our adversarial system makes sense 
in the context of subject matter jurisdiction. Though a subject matter 
 
69 Id. at 1203 (stating that “‘claim-processing rules.’ . . . [T]hat seek to promote the 
orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at 
certain specified times” should not be deemed jurisdictional). For a discussion of the many 
risks inherent in converting administrative exhaustion, a non-jurisdictional affirmative 
defense in Title VII cases, into a defense that implicates subject matter jurisdiction, see 
Katherine A. Macfarlane, The Improper Dismissal of Title VII Claims on “Jurisdictional” 
Exhaustion Grounds: How Federal Courts Require That Allegations Be Presented to an 
Agency Without the Resources to Consider Them, 21 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 213 
(2011). 
70 Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 968 (7th Cir. 1997). 
71 Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648 656–57 (4th Cir. 2006). 
72 Id. at 654. 
73 Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412–13 (2000). 
74 Id. 
75 Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011). 
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jurisdiction defense may benefit one party over another, it more 
importantly protects the courts’ own interests: “federal courts have an 
independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of 
their jurisdiction.”76 Therefore, “they must raise and decide 
jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook[ed] or 
elect[ed] not to press.”77 
But if a court is dealing with a non-jurisdictional affirmative 
defense, it has no Article III-based obligation to raise the defense and 
little reason to upset the normal course of operation. Nevertheless, 
federal courts have been exceedingly willing to raise affirmative 
defenses sua sponte in habeas actions. This is the case even though 
the defenses have the effect of defeating claims that, absent the 
application of the defenses, might have succeeded in overturning 
wrongful imprisonments.78 
IV 
THE SPECIAL CONCERN OF HABEAS CASES: RAISING AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSES TO DEFEAT A PETITIONER’S APPLICATION TO BE FREED 
Habeas cases are frequently exempted from the category of 
“ordinary” cases in which Rule 8(c) applies. According to the Fourth 
Circuit, defenses raised in habeas cases implicate “important judicial 
and public interests,” and the courts adjudicating habeas petitions 
have a “quasi-inquisitorial role . . . to screen initial filings.”79 
Therefore, according to the Fourth Circuit, the very nature of a habeas 
action justifies departure from the general rule that a defendant “must 
either timely raise a statute of limitations defense or waive its 
benefits.”80 
The Fourth Circuit’s position is not extreme. At all levels of federal 
court adjudication, from reports and recommendations issued by 
magistrates on motions to dismiss, to Supreme Court decisions 
regarding the scope of a petition for certiorari, federal courts bend 
over backwards to raise affirmative defenses on behalf of habeas 
respondents. In the context of habeas, the courts have abandoned any 
 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209–10 (2005). “Normally, the only proper 
defendant in a habeas case is the petitioner’s ‘immediate custodian’—that is, the warden of 
the facility in which the petitioner is incarcerated at the time he files the habeas petition.” 
Fletcher v. Reilly, 433 F.3d 867, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
79 Eriline v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 657 (2006). 
80 Id. 
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concern for the adversarial process and Rule 8(c) by raising the most 
significant affirmative defenses sua sponte. When courts take such 
unwarranted action, they are more advocate than neutral 
decisionmaker. 
The defenses subject to sua sponte action in habeas cases are 
numerous. As explained below, district courts may consider a statute 
of limitations defense to habeas sua sponte so long as the government 
did not purposefully omit it from its answer or motion to dismiss.81 
Exhaustion may also be raised sua sponte.82 A court may apply the 
nonretroactivity rule announced in Teague v. Lane83 sua sponte.84 
Although procedural default is not a jurisdictional defense, and Rule 
8(c) mandates that it should be waived if it does not appear in the 
respondent’s answer, courts nevertheless do not hesitate to raise the 
defense sua sponte.85 
Day v. McDonough is the Supreme Court’s most recent ruling on 
which defenses may be raised sua sponte in habeas. While expanding 
the category of defenses that may be raised sua sponte, the Court 
paradoxically noted that district judges “have no obligation to assist 
attorneys representing the State.”86 Yet no heed is paid to this 
warning. There is a competing principle throughout federal habeas 
precedent: habeas relief, for some reason, is “different,” and those 
opposing habeas petitions deserve a helping hand from the courts. As 
explained below, by raising affirmative defenses sua sponte, courts 
provide significant, case-dispositive assistance to attorneys 
representing the State—at the expense of those unjustly behind bars. 
A. Granberry v. Greer: Appellate Courts May Raise Exhaustion Sua 
Sponte 
In Granberry, a state prisoner applied to the Southern District of 
Illinois for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.87 
The district court dismissed the petition pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.88 On appeal, the State of Illinois 
for the first time raised an exhaustion defense—that is, it argued in 
 
81 Day, 547 U.S. at 209–10. 
82 Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133 (1987). 
83 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989). 
84 Day, 547 U.S. at 206. 
85 Elzy v. United States, 205 F.3d 882, 886 (6th Cir. 2000). 
86 Day, 547 U.S. at 210. 
87 481 U.S. at 130. 
88 Id. 
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support of the lower court’s dismissal on the new grounds that the 
petitioner had failed to exhaust his state remedies.89 Pursuant to Rule 
8(c), the State should have raised the defense in its responsive 
pleading; instead, the State moved for dismissal for failure to state a 
claim. But the court of appeals rejected petitioner’s argument that the 
State waived the defense by not raising it at the district court level.90 
In considering this defense, the court of appeals also overlooked the 
general rule that a federal appellate court “does not consider an issue 
not passed upon below.”91 
In reviewing whether the appellate court could address the issue 
even though the State had failed to raise it at the district court level, 
the Court acknowledged that, unlike a subject matter jurisdiction 
defense, “failure to exhaust state remedies does not deprive an 
appellate court of jurisdiction to consider the merits of a habeas 
corpus application.”92 Therefore, the court was not required to raise 
the defense of exhaustion sua sponte in order to preserve its own 
interests. The Court also reviewed precedent in which it had 
“expressed [its] reluctance to adopt rules that allow a party to 
withhold raising a defense until after the ‘main event’—in this case, 
the proceeding in the District Court—is over.”93 
The Court chose a middle ground, declining to require that 
appellate courts raise nonexhaustion sua sponte, and also declining to 
hold that the State’s omission of the defense waived it for good. 
Instead, the Court held that appellate courts may, but are not required 
to, consider the defense of failure to exhaust even if the State failed to 
raise the defense before the district court.94 
In so holding, the Court relied upon the history and purpose of the 
exhaustion of state remedies defense. First, it noted that the defense 
was long-standing, applied even before Congress codified it in 1948; 
as early as 1886, the Court wrote that “‘federal courts should not 
consider a claim in a habeas corpus petition until after the state courts 
have had an opportunity to act.’”95 Second, the exhaustion doctrine is 
justified by comity to state courts: “‘federal courts . . . will interfere 
with the administration of justice in the state courts only in rare cases 
 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 130. 
91 Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976). 
92 Granberry, 418 U.S. at 131. 
93 Id. at 132 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89–90 (1977). 
94 Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 206 (2006). 
95 Granberry, 481 U.S. at 133 (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982)). 
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where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown to 
exist.’”96 
Third, even though the State “has a duty to advise the district court 
whether the prisoner has . . . exhausted all available state remedies” in 
its answer, when the state fails to do so, it may be appropriate “for the 
court of appeals to take a fresh look at the issue.”97 Comity is also a 
concern for appellate courts: at the appellate level, courts are to 
“determine whether the interests of comity and federalism will be 
better served by addressing the merits forthwith or by requiring a 
series of additional state and district court proceedings before 
reviewing the merits of the petitioner’s claim.”98 
According to Granberry, raising the exhaustion defense sua sponte 
is appropriate in at least two instances. First, raising the defense on 
the State’s behalf is appropriate where exhaustion may address an 
unresolved question of law or fact.99 Therefore, once exhaustion is 
completed, the Court need only review the issues that truly require 
federal review, an approach that serves both “both comity and judicial 
efficiency.”100 Second, if the habeas petition clearly does not raise a 
colorable federal claim, then the parties’ interests, as well the Court’s 
interests, are well-served by affirming the district court’s dismissal on 
exhaustion grounds.101 
The prior justifications hinge on an outcome in which the petition 
is without merit. The Court found that, by contrast, where the district 
court has held a trial on the merits and finds that there was a 
miscarriage of justice, then the appellate courts should, in those 
instances, find that the exhaustion defense has been waived.102 
Otherwise, the Court would “delay in granting relief that is plainly 
warranted.”103 
Granberry is severe: “the asserting of an exhaustion issue for the 
first time on appeal can result in the loss of an entire lawsuit.”104 
Also, “[a] rule requiring dismissal when the defense of nonexhaustion 
 
96 Id. at 134 (quoting Rose, 455 U.S. at 515–16) (second internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 134–35. 
100 Id. at 135. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Ybarra v. Sumner, 678 F. Supp. 1480, 1483 (D. Nev. 1988). 
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is raised at the appellate level for the first time . . . would never 
operate to the prisoner’s benefit.”105 If the prisoner wins in district 
court, then the State could raise the defense on appeal.106 If the 
prisoner loses in the district court and appeals, “the rule requiring 
dismissal would not result in reversal of the denial of habeas 
relief.”107 
B. Caspari v. Bohlen: Federal Courts May Raise Nonretroactivity Sua 
Sponte 
In Caspari, the Court addressed whether the Double Jeopardy 
Clause prohibited a court from subjecting a defendant to multiple 
noncapital sentence enhancement proceedings.108 The state trial court 
sentenced Bohlen as a prior offender, but the Missouri Court of 
Appeals reversed because there were no factual findings to establish 
that he held that status.109 On remand, Bohlen argued that permitting 
the State another opportunity to prove that he qualified for the 
sentence enhancement violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.110 The 
Court concluded that, at the time of Bohlen’s conviction and sentence, 
the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply to noncapital sentencing.111 
As a result, Bohlen’s habeas claim violated the nonretroactivity 
rule announced in Teague v. Lane.112 “The nonretroactivity principle 
prevents a federal court from granting habeas corpus relief to a state 
prisoner based on a rule announced after his conviction and sentence 
became final.”113 Nonretroactivity does not implicate a court’s 
jurisdiction; therefore, federal courts are not required to raise the 
defense sua sponte.114 However, the Supreme Court explained that “a 
federal court may, but need not, decline to apply Teague if the State 
 
105 Granberry, 481 U.S. at 133 n.6. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 386 (1994). 
109 Id. at 387. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 393. 
112 Id. at 393 (“[A] reasonable jurist reviewing our precedents at the time respondent’s 
conviction and sentence became final would not have considered the application of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause to a noncapital sentencing proceeding to be dictated by our 
precedents.”). 
113 Id. at 389. 
114 Id. (citing Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990)). 
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does not argue it.”115 In so holding, the Court did not identify the 
policy justifying this particular departure from Rule 8(c).116 
Nevertheless, the rule remains that the nonretroactivity defense 
may be raised sua sponte. In applying this rule, lower courts have 
paid lip service to “finality and comity,” though the Supreme Court 
has never stated that Teague should be raised sua sponte for those 
reasons.
117
 
C. Appellate Courts Have Unanimously Held Procedural Default 
May Be Raised Sua Sponte 
Procedural default is an additional exhaustion rule. It “ensure[s] 
that state prisoners not only become ineligible for state relief before 
raising their claims in federal court, but also that they give state courts 
a sufficient opportunity to decide those claims before doing so.”118 As 
the Supreme Court has explained, “[a] habeas petitioner who has 
concededly exhausted his state remedies must also have properly 
done so by giving the State a fair ‘opportunity to pass upon [his 
claims].’”119 When a prisoner has not adhered to the State’s 
procedural rules, he has procedurally defaulted his habeas claims and 
can only proceed in federal court if he can demonstrate “‘cause and 
prejudice’” or “‘a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’”120 
As a result, if state law requires that a criminal defendant challenge 
the composition of a grand jury in advance of trial, he must have 
actually challenged the grand jury in advance of trial if he wishes to 
raise the same challenge in a federal habeas petition. The Supreme 
Court justifies the procedural default rule as yet another manner in 
which the federal system bows in comity to state courts and their 
remedies.121 Comity dictates, the Court has held, that a habeas 
petitioner “use the State’s established appellate review procedures 
before he presents his claims to a federal court.”122 
Whether the defense may be raised sua sponte is an open question 
in the Supreme Court. Yet “the Courts of Appeals have unanimously 
 
115 Id. (citing Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 228–29 (1994)). 
116 See id. 
117 See, e.g., Prevatte v. French, 459 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1328, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 
118 O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 853 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
119 Id. at 854 (alteration in original) (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 
(1950)). 
120 Id. at 854 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 484, 495 (1986)). 
121 Id. at 853–54. 
122 Id. at 845. 
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held that, in appropriate circumstances, courts, on their own initiative, 
may raise a petitioner’s procedural default.”123 In the courts of 
appeals, the justifications for raising this defense sua sponte range 
from “comity,”124 concerns for the finality of criminal judgments, 
subjective decisions with respect to whether the defendant was 
“blameworthy” for failing to raise the issue, to conclusions that 
procedural default may be “manifest from the record and, hence,” do 
not require further fact-finding.125 
D. Day v. McDonough: Statute of Limitations Defenses May Be 
Raised Sua Sponte 
Until AEDPA, there was no statute of limitations governing habeas 
petitions.126 But since 1996, habeas petitions must be filed one year 
from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 
review.”127 In Day, the State of Florida’s answer to Patrick Day’s 
habeas petition stated that the petition was timely, even though 
pursuant to AEDPA, it was not.128 
The Court explained that “[o]rdinarily in civil litigation, a statutory 
time limitation is forfeited if not raised in a defendant’s answer or in 
an amendment thereto.”129 Moreover, ordinarily, the Court “would 
count it an abuse of discretion to override a State’s deliberate waiver 
of a limitations defense.”130 Yet in Day, the Court did override the 
State’s waiver on the grounds that the State’s waiver was not 
intelligent but rather the result of miscalculation of whether the 
“tight” statute of limitations had run.131 Therefore, the district court 
had discretion to correct the miscalculation, and could dismiss the 
petition as untimely under AEDPA’s one-year limitation period.132 
The Court’s holding relied first on the procedural posture of the 
petition. First, the Court noted that if the magistrate judge had not 
raised the defense sua sponte, the judge might have instead “informed 
 
123 Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 207 (2006). 
124 Brewer v. Marshall, 119 F.3d 993, 999 (1st Cir. 1997). 
125 Rosario v. United States, 164 F.3d 729, 732–33 (2d Cir. 1998). 
126 Day, 547 U.S. at 202 n.1. 
127 Id. at 201 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2006)). 
128 Id. at 203. 
129 Id. at 202 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c), 12(b), 15(a)). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
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the State of its obvious computation error and entertained an 
amendment to the State’s answer.”133 Second, the Court stated that “it 
would make scant sense to distinguish in this regard AEDPA’s time 
bar from other threshold constraints on federal habeas petitioners.”134 
Third, the court was satisfied that the magistrate judge gave Day 
“due notice and a fair opportunity” to oppose dismissal on the 
grounds that his petition was untimely.135 The court was also 
persuaded that the State had merely committed inadvertent error.136 
The notice had issued some nine months after the State answered the 
petition, no court proceedings had occurred in the interim, and 
nothing else in the record suggested that the State “strategically” 
withheld the defense or chose to relinquish it.137 Finally, the Court 
noted that “[a] district court’s discretion is confined within these 
limits,” and “should a State intelligently choose to waive a statute of 
limitations defense, a district court would not be at liberty to disregard 
that choice.”138 
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Wood v. Milyard 
to address a slight variation on the question presented in Day: whether 
appellate courts, like district courts, have the authority to raise sua 
sponte a 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) statute of limitations defense.139 The 
petitioner argued that only district courts, and not appellate courts, 
should able to raise the defense because, essentially, district courts are 
better-situated to do so: 
A clear requirement that the state raise any § 2244(d) limitations 
defense in the district court has the virtue of simplicity and ease of 
enforcement. It advances judicial economy by requiring that 
dispositive limitations defenses be raised and resolved before 
judicial resources are needlessly expended in deciding the merits of 
a case or other difficult issues of exhaustion or procedural default. 
Such requirement discourages sandbagging, preventing a party from 
initially withholding a limitations defense for strategic advantage, in 
the hope of prevailing on other claims or defenses. It advances the 
adversary and party presentation principles underlying the 
American judicial system, by requiring issues to be presented by the 
parties to the court. And, finally, it advances the judicial neutrality 
 
133 Id. at 209 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006)). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 210. 
136 Id. at 210–11. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 211 n.11. 
139 Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1829 (2012). 
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and appearance of impartiality that is essential to our system of 
justice.140 
Respondents have noted that Granberry involved an appellate court’s 
sua sponte raising of an affirmative defense.141 They have also relied 
on the argument that habeas is unique: “given . . . the special concerns 
underlying federal review of state-court convictions, the courts of 
appeals should have especially wide latitude to consider a forfeited 
issue that can terminate the appeal expeditiously.”142 
The Court decided Milyard on April 24, 2012.143  The Court 
agreed with Respondents, holding that “courts of appeals, like district 
courts, have the authority—though not the obligation—to raise a 
forfeited timeliness defense on their own initiative.”144 Nevertheless, 
the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s decision to raise the limitations 
defense sua sponte on the grounds that the State’s waiver of the 
defense was a knowing waiver.145 As a result, the circumstance 
presented to the Tenth Circuit was not the sort of extraordinary 
instance in which the appellate court was permitted to raise on its own 
an issue otherwise not raised below.146 
Despite reversing the Tenth Circuit, Milyard did not undo the 
damage done in Day. Rather, it opened the door to broader sua sponte 
authority at the appellate level. 
V 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN HABEAS PETITIONS SHOULD BE WAIVED 
IF NOT RAISED ACCORDING TO RULE 8(C) 
A. Rule 8(c) Applies to Habeas Cases 
The Court’s reasoning for exempting affirmative defenses in 
habeas petitions from the harshness of Rule 8(c) is unconvincing. The 
reasoning in Day v. McDonough is conclusory: it would make “scant 
sense” to distinguish AEDPA’s time bar from other affirmative 
 
140 Brief for Petitioner at 27, Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826 (2012) (No. 10-9995). 
141 Brief for Respondents at 14, Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826 (2012) (No. 10-
9995). 
142 Id. at 15. 
143 Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826. 
144 Id. at 1834. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
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defenses available to habeas respondents.147 Not only is this reason 
conclusory, but it assumes that the Court’s precedent regarding 
exhaustion of state remedies, procedural default, nonretroactivity, and 
(prior to AEDPA) abuse of the writ is reliable. But Day is also wrong 
for a simpler reason: Rule 8(c) should apply to habeas corpus 
defenses. 
Day does not identify any “inconsistency between habeas corpus 
practice and the usual civil forfeiture rule,”148 and “applying the 
ordinary rule of forfeiture to the AEDPA statute of limitations creates 
no inconsistency with the Habeas Rules.”149 Rule 8(c) should have 
applied in Day, and should have stopped the Court from endorsing the 
district court’s raising of an already waived defense sua sponte. 
With respect to Rule 8(c), there is no reason to treat a State 
respondent any differently than another defendant. As explained 
below, Judge Clark argued for strict compliance with Rule 8(c), with 
no exceptions granted to defendants who happened to also be the 
government. He even addressed a statute of limitations defense, 
explaining that in cases in which the United States is the defendant, 
he still could not see how the defense “could properly be a 
jurisdictional matter” raised sua sponte by the courts; rather, Rule 
8(c) should govern how the defense is to be raised.150 
Judge Clark explained that when the Federal Rules endeavored to 
treat a particular litigant differently, they did so expressly. For 
example, when the United States is the defendant, the Federal Rules 
give them more time than other litigants have to answer.151 However, 
with the exception of the time to answer, or other express provisions, 
“these rules apply to the United States as a litigant as much as to 
anyone else.”152 There is no reason to treat the United States 
government or any State government preferentially when it comes to 
affirmative defenses, in habeas cases or any other kind of litigation. 
Even though habeas relief may be “unique,” the applicable pleading 
standards are routine. 
  
 
147 Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 
majority opinion at 209). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 218. 
150 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 44, at 50–51. 
151 See id. at 50. 
152 Id. at 50. 
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B. No Policy Reason Justifies Sua Sponte Revival of Affirmative 
Defenses 
The Supreme Court has justified its sua sponte precedent on the 
grounds of comity to state court judgments, by minimizing its 
procedural impact, and by citing questionable precedent. None of 
these justifications support overruling Rule 8(c). 
1. Comity Justifies the Existence of Certain Affirmative Defenses, But 
Does Not Excuse Raising Them Sua Sponte 
Granberry permits appellate courts to raise exhaustion sua sponte 
on several stated grounds: (1) courts have been able to do so for some 
time; (2) interfering with state court judgments should be a rare 
practice; and (3) comity and federalism require deference to state 
court decisions.153 Similarly, the appellate court practice of raising 
procedural default sua sponte also pays lip service to finality and 
comity.154 Both of these precedents rely on the deference supposedly 
due state court sentences and procedures. Yet this deference is 
misplaced. 
First, in concluding that comity justifies permitting federal courts 
to raise affirmative defenses sua sponte, courts conflate the need for 
the defense itself with the need for the defense to be raised sua 
sponte. For example, Granberry emphasizes that “comity was the 
basis for the exhaustion doctrine,” and that exhaustion renders 
interference with state court judgments only in rare instances.155 But 
the question presented in Granberry was not whether exhaustion is a 
viable defense. The question was whether a court should raise the 
defense when the defendant waives it.156 Re-emphasizing the nature 
of the defense itself sidesteps the issue of whether there is an 
additional need to preserve it on a defendant’s behalf. Granberry’s 
reliance on comity is circular reasoning. 
Second, invoking comity in habeas cases overlooks the very 
purpose of habeas: review of state court criminal judgments.157 The 
availability of federal relief to persons in state custody “is a procedure 
 
153 See supra notes 101–04. 
154 See supra notes 123–24, 126–27. 
155 Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134 (1987). 
156 Id. at 130. 
157 Sylvander v. New Eng. Home For Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103, 1111 (1st Cir. 
1978). 
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of unique potency within the federal-state framework.”158 It is unique 
because the procedure prioritizes fixing constitutional errors over a 
state’s interest in finality. “Federal habeas involves a substantial 
thrust by the federal system into the sphere normally reserved to the 
states and hence a change in the federal-state balance.”159 
The exhaustion requirement balances habeas’s concern for 
constitutional issues, but habeas in the first instance is a mechanism 
that does not respect comity. As a result, it makes little sense to use 
comity as the justification that permits a court to act on behalf of a 
State respondent each time it chooses to do so. Also, this reflexive 
reliance on comity overlooks the fact that “federal habeas . . . offers a 
federal forum regardless of what state proceedings have already taken 
place.”160 Comity alone does not justify overruling Rule 8(c). 
2. The Federal Rules Provide Adequate Safeguards for Defendants 
Who Waive Affirmative Defenses: There Is No Need for Additional 
Rules in Habeas 
In Day, the Court was willing to permit a magistrate judge to raise 
the statute of limitations defense sua sponte because the magistrate 
might have alternatively informed the State of its calculation error and 
granted leave to amend.161 The Court stated that it saw no difference 
between permitting a defense to be raised sua sponte and the 
Magistrate’s ability to grant the State leave to amend after the error 
was noted.162 
This approach disregards Rule 8(c). “If there truly were no 
dispositive difference between following and disregarding the rules 
that Congress has enacted, the natural conclusion would be that there 
is no compelling reason to disregard” Rule 8(c).163 Moreover, there 
already exists a well-developed body of law to govern the district 
courts’ exercise of discretion under Rule 15(a).164 That is, if the 
Federal Rules already provide adequate procedural safeguards, there 
is no compelling justification for giving State respondents any 
additional breaks. 
 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 1111–12. 
160 Id. at 1112. 
161 Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)). 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 216 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
164 Id. at 216–17. 
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3. Caspari Was Wrongly Decided: Casting Aside Rule 8(c)’s Waiver 
Rule With Respect to Retroactivity Has No Precedential Support 
Caspari was wrongly decided because it treated dicta in a prior 
case as applicable precedent. Relying on the holding in Schiro v. 
Farley, the Supreme Court explained that “a federal court may, but 
need not, decline to apply Teague[‘s nonretroactivity rule] if the State 
does not argue it.”165 However, the Caspari court’s citation to Schiro 
misrepresents its thrust. In Schiro, the Court never reached the State’s 
Teague argument because it had “failed to argue Teague in its brief in 
opposition” and “a State can waive the Teague bar by not raising 
it.”166 Schiro does not support the proposition that Teague may be 
raised at any stage sua sponte.167 The Schiro “holding” that it could 
have reached the Teague issue sua sponte is dicta—it did not reach 
the issue.168 
Caspari also reached the State’s nonretroactivity defense, which 
was not squarely raised by the certiorari petition, because it concluded 
that the issue “is a subsidiary question fairly included in the question 
presented.”169 As Justice Stevens’s dissent highlighted, the 
nonretroactivity principle announced in Teague v. Lane is not a 
jurisdictional rule, but rather a prudential rule, and, hence, judge-
made, and waivable.170 Stevens would have held that the State 
forfeited its Teague defense under the Supreme Court Rule 14.1(a).171 
CONCLUSION: HABEAS LITIGATION MUST BE ADVERSARIAL WITH 
NO FAVORS GRANTED TO ALREADY POWERFUL RESPONDENTS 
Federal court litigation is conducted within an adversarial system 
of justice. Parties are responsible for developing their own strategy.172 
They set the scope of litigation, whereas “courts are generally limited 
 
165 Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994). 
166 Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994) (emphasis added).  
167 See also Alan W. Clarke, Procedural Labyrinths and the Injustice of Death: A 
Critique of Death Penalty Habeas Corpus (Part Two), 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 303, 325 
(1996) (describing the mixed messages of Schiro and Caspari with respect to waiver of the 
nonretroactivity defense). 
168 See Schiro, 510 U.S. at 229. 
169 Caspari, 510 U.S. at 389. 
170 Id. at 397–98 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
171 Id. Supreme Court Rule 14.1(a) provides that “[t]he statement of any question 
presented [in a petition for certiorari] is deemed to comprise every subsidiary question 
fairly included therein. Only the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein, 
will be considered by the Court.” 
172 United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 750 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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to addressing the claims and arguments advanced by the parties.”173 
Usually, “[c]ourts do not . . . raise claims or arguments on their 
own.”
174
 This divide is a hallmark of American federal litigation. 
Unlike the judges of the continental legal systems of Europe, who 
serve in both investigative and adjudicatory capacities, American 
judges are informed by the parties through an adversarial method. . . . 
Thus, American judges play a limited role; the burden rests on the 
parties (both private and governmental) to ensure that offenses are 
prosecuted and relevant issues come to light.175 
A case’s relevant issues come to light first in the pleadings. The 
Supreme Court’s recent pleading standard decisions, Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal176 and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,177 highlight the Court’s 
willingness to effect harsh outcomes based on failure to adhere to 
another subsection of Rule 8.178 Yet despite the case-ending 
implications of failure to adhere to these new pleading standards, a 
judge need not remind a plaintiff of the Twombly and Iqbal pleading 
standards before it grants a motion to dismiss. The Court has required 
plaintiffs to take the reins of their litigation, with respect to both 
substance and procedure.179 There should be no hesitation to hold 
defendants to similar standards. 
Parties must pay attention not only to their substantive strategies, 
but also to the procedural consequences of their litigation decisions. 
For example, the strategic decision to improperly plead a claim can 
defeat that claim at the motion to dismiss stage.180 There is no 
question that procedural strategy can be as case dispositive as 
substantive strategy. 
Failure to adhere to Rule 8(c) can also have dispositive outcomes. 
In Day, if the Supreme Court had not saved the otherwise waived 
 
173 Henderson ex rel Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011). 
174 Id. 
175 United States v. Fifield, 485 F.3d 1053, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 2007) (O’Scannlain, J, 
concurring specially) (citations omitted). 
176 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
177 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
178 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” (quoting Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 557)). 
179 Cf. Fifield, 485 F.3d at 1057 (explaining that the functional divide between judge 
and party is important enough to “leave some wrongs unpunished” in order to preserve it; 
“the doctrines of waiver and procedural default represent this willingness.”). 
180 A defendant’s answer or a motion to dismiss must be filed within 20 days of a 
plaintiff’s complaint. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). 
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limitations defense, the petitioner’s habeas application might have 
been granted. But Rule 8(c) was intended to be a steadfast rule with 
potentially severe consequences for those who did not adhere to its 
strictures, and it should not have been overlooked. 
Habeas litigation is the last place in which courts should be 
disregarding Rule 8(c). Sua sponte action of any kind risks tipping the 
scales in favor of one party and against another. But raising 
affirmative defenses sua sponte in habeas is particularly unfair in light 
of the curtailed substantive paths to habeas relief—habeas petitioners, 
not State respondents, are most in need of the courts’ procedural 
assistance. 
Moreover, the procedural decision to raise certain defenses to 
habeas sua sponte cannot rely solely upon the nature of the relief 
sought. The Supreme Court’s deference to comity in its affirmative 
defense cases is really a discussion of what sort of habeas defenses a 
court should entertain.181 But procedural rules should not vary 
depending on the kind of substantive relief at issue. They should 
remain steady regardless of a judge’s subjective feelings toward the 
importance of a particular claim or defense. Otherwise, Rule 8(c) is a 
rule that will always be waived depending on the circumstances. This 
is not what the Rule was meant to do. 
Finally, to the extent procedural favors are needed in habeas cases, 
it is petitioners who need them. Even before AEDPA, Justice Stevens 
warned that the Court “has fashioned harsh rules” which “defeat 
substantial constitutional claims” brought in habeas petitions.182 
Justice Stevens argued that “[i]f we are to apply such a strict approach 
to waiver in habeas corpus litigation, we should hold the warden to 
the same standard.”183 
 
 
181 See discussion supra Part V.B.2. 
182 Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 397 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
183 Id. 
